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Introduction
All over the developing world, matters are in a state of flux. Many of the political institutions with which the independent nations of Africa entered the post-independence era have 
been changed. In many of these states, the story run the same 
course: independence ushered in a brief period of “constitutional 
governm ent’ modelled on the governmental institutions of the 
imperial country, then gave way to one-party rule and finally the 
military ended the scenario with a coup d ’etat. In addition tc th* 
afflictions brought on these nations by political instability,, thfc 
nations are also experiencing massive social change. At the same 
time, the leaders of these states have had to embark on programmes 
designed to bring the benefits of modem technology to their fellow- 
countrymen. It is commonly asserted these days that the lot of 
developing countries in spite of (or perhaps because of it) their 
attem pts to modernise themselves has been turmoil, warfare, 
political chaos and economic stagnation.
The resulting situation has given scholars a field day- Various 
explanations have been given for this state of affairs in the 
developing world. The failure of constitutional government in the 
developing world in Africa is often attributed to cultural diversity 
between the developing countries and the western European 
countries from which most of the governmental institutions had 
been borrow ed.1 According to this view, the crisis in constitutional 
government in Afric.a can be explained away by the differences in 
the cultures of Europe and Africa. The developing countries in 
Africa inherited alien governmental structures from their colonial 
masters. The institutions being aiien, it was not surprising that the 
leaders were unable to keep the system running smoothly. Thus, 
Professor Shil$ suggests that Parliamentary institutions, 
institutionalised dissent and all the paraphernalia of modern 
constitutionalism are “alien to the traditional image of the world of 
public decisions...”2 
One is uncertain about the extent to which the cultural diversity 
eory offers an adequate explanation of the difficulties 
institutional government faces in the developing countries. But a 
Her examination of this theory is outside the focus of this paper, 
haps, however, it is worthwhile to observe that too much room
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has been given to deductions from “traditional society” in the 
discussion of the problems concerning the governing process in the 
developing countries than would appear justifiable. For the fact is 
that the eighty-odd years of colonial rule experienced by most of 
these countries has transformed their societies in such a way that 
explanations based on “ tradition” alone are often useful only as a 
historical analysis. Neither Ghana in 1957 nor Nigeria in 1960, for 
example, was a reflection of the Ashanti or Hausa-Fulani empires 
of old.
A nother reason often given is that the citizens of these states 
usually do not give their first allegiance to the nation -  the problem 
of ethnic allegiance. In the struggle for independence, so this view 
goes, the different ethnic groups, unite to fight against the common 
enemy, the colonial master. Once the impostor is driven off, the 
bond that keeps them together is broken. Inter-ethnic rivalries 
come to the'fore. The Ibo thinks of himself more as an Ibo than as a 
Nigerian; the Ewe thinks of himself more as an Ewe than a 
Ghanaian. The heterogeneity of the peoples making up the 
citizenry of these countries is thus postulated as an important 
obstacle to constitutional government. Often, of course, the 
argument is foot-noted with the explanation that the size of the 
ethnic problem varies from country to country.
But while it is arguable that having to live together for a long time 
has blurred the ethnic diversities of the different peoples in W estern 
Europe, the f?ct remains that a Scot is different from an Englishman 
and. on occasion, is as likely to emphasize his “Scotness” rather 
than his “Britishness” just as the Ashanti of Ghana; in Belgium, 
several years of living together appears to have only exacerbated 
the unease with which the Dutch and French segments of the 
country live together. Yet few people will deny that Great Britain 
and Belgium operate the constitutional governmental system quite 
admirably! W hether ethnic allegiance promotes or discourages 
constitutionalism appears to need re-examination.
In more recent years, greater emphasis has been placed on the 
developm ent needs of the developing countries. According to this 
view, the development needs of the developing countries require us 
to postpone the expectation of the arrival of constitutiv?11^  
government and the realisation of civil liberties in these countries. 
The leaders of these countries have to modernise their countries.
2
process in which economic development occupies a central place. 
They have to bring the benefits of modern technology to the 
doorstep of their fellow-countrymen. President Nyerere of 
Tanzania suggests, for example, that this task of development 
creates ‘a continuing state of emergency’ in the developing 
countries and justifies the one-party system.3
In many cases, the resources these countries have at their disposal 
for the achievement of their development objectives are slender. 
Yet develop they must. Besides, development is one of the issues on 
which the leaders cannot drag their feet. For the slow pace or 
absence of development had been used by them as one of the 
justifications for calling upon the “masses” to join hands in 
throwing off the colonial yoke.
Not only did the leaders have to embark on development, they 
had to do it within the shortest possible time. They cast envious 
glances in the direction of Russia and China who within a quarter of 
the time it took the developed nations of the West to reach their 
p resen t standards of living had made comparable efforts. The 
Russian ‘miracle’ had been possible within the short time it took 
largely because its leaders paid little attention to the rules of 
constitutionalism, or at least, so it is claimed. This further lured the 
leaders of the developing countries away from the strictures of 
constitutional government. The fact that socialism and communism 
mean something different to these leaders, not only as between 
themselves but also from the sense in which these terms are 
understood in Russia and China is often noted.4 But this does not 
deter them from employing the term.
As for civil liberties, following the lead of some Western scholars 
who characterise them as “bourgeois luxuries” designed to protect 
“capitalist interests” and to deflect these countries from their 
developm ent courses, the leaders of the developing countries 
appeal to their fellow-citizens to accept their postponement in the 
short term until some future time. Freedom is thus presented as if it 
were an enemy of the material development of the individual.
Constitutional government and civil liberties are thus presented 
as incompatible with the need to develop which is felt to be and 
rnght to be the primary concern of developing countries. To be sure 
he incompatibility theory is not accepted by all. Some scholars, 
wen while recognising the importance of development, have
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implicit faith in the constitutional scheme as perhaps the best 
atm osphere in which development can be achieved. Such scholars 
have concentrated their efforts on building models of a constitution 
within which the development need can be accommodated.6
Some or all of the views noted about the alleged teething 
problems of constitutionalism, civil liberties and development 
above find strong support in the great national debate going on 
around us about the future direction of our constitutional life. 
Besides the debate, we also have a deliberative body currently 
sitting, which has been given the task of helping us produce the 
constitutive document with which to embark on a new political life, 
a life which has been described by the government as 
“constitutional rule” .7
Forecasts of the prospects for constitutionalism and civil liberties 
in developing countries usually end on a pessimistic note.0 Perhaps, 
pessimism is unavoidable if we try to find out how far the structure 
of government in Ghana conforms to that of Great Britain. It is 
submitted that such an approach is fundamentally wrong. The 
weakness in that approach is that it masks the fact that the 
acknowledged constitutional governments of our contemporary 
world employ different structures to achieve constitutional rule. A 
more meaningful approach will, in my humble opinion, be to focus 
on the main principle embodied in these ideas and let those 
principles guide and inform both our thinking on the m atter and our 
efforts at translating our thinking into reality. It seems hardly 
justifiable to insist that developing countries adopt the particular 
structures, institutions or vehicles of any constitutional 
government. That choice in itself would prove extremely difficult. 
For which is to prevail, American, British, Swiss, Dutch or French 
institutions? Wholly or partially?
We need then to reduce the key words constitutionalism, civil 
liberties and development into digestible form to enable us make 
both an informed appraisal of our constitutional past and to 
approach the current exercise in an intelligent manner, free from 
avoidable J apses. This will be followed by a brief account of the 
constitutional iu “ ° f  Ghana since independence. Finally, I will,take 
the liberty of inflicting of>rne personal views of mine on the ladies 
and gentlemen herein assembled- I have chosen constitutionalism 
civil liberties and development because, in my opinion, judging
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from what has so far been contributed to the national debate as well 
as the thinking of government, they stand out clearly as “ the good 
things” everyone wants for Ghana.
Constitutionalism
W hat then is “constitutionalism”? What do we mean when we 
refer to a government as “constitutional”?
In the best tradition of scholarship, perhaps, I should start by 
saying what is not constitutionalism. A preliminary issue which is a 
constant source of confusion in discussions about this concept is its 
relationship with democracy. It is often said, and to some extent 
accurately, that there is probably no other word in the language of 
politics about whose meaning so much uncertainty exists as the 
term ‘democracy’. While there is room for disagreement between 
two people about whether the government of the German 
Democratic Republic is a democracy or whether capitalist society is 
truly democratic, however, most people would agree with Professor 
Nwabueze that a government is a democracy if it is popularly based, 
rests on the consent of the governed, which consent is given in 
universally free elections, and which provides a mechanism for the 
governed to change the governors in the event of dissatisfaction 
with their performance.10
But care has to be taken not to confuse a popularly elected and 
responsible government with a “constitutional” one. For there are 
in our modern society many governments whose popular basis 
appears unquestionable but which any informed scholar would 
hesitate to describe as “constitutional” . The point being made here 
is that a constitutional government and a democracy are not 
necessarily the same thing. A constitutional government in modern 
times will also be democratic but a democratic government is not 
necessarily constitutional.11 The democratic institutions such as 
elections, parties etc. are only tools for constituticnalizing a 
government.
A further point is also called for. Constitutionalism does not 
merely require the existence of a Constitution. Constitutionalism 
has indeed come to presuppose the existence of a Constitution and 
anyone embarking on constitutionalising a government or 
establishing constitutional rule today must need start with one. A 
country then, it must be understood, can have a constitution without 
constitutionalism, particularly, in situations where the constitution
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is only an enabling act which sanctions governmental fiat.
W hat then is Constitutionalism? It may be roughly defined as the 
art of providing a system of effective restraints on the exercise of 
governmental power. ^
Governm ent is necessary for the effective running of ordered 
society. Y et long before Lord Acton’s famous aphorism about the 
corruptive nature of power, man was alive to the arbitrariness 
inherent in the power of government. Constitutionalism then 
recognises the necessity for government while seeking to curb this 
inherent arbitranness. As Carl Friedrich put it neatly:-
“ ...(it) embodies the simple proposition that the government is a 
set of activities organised by and operated on behalf of the 
people, but subject to a series of restraints which attempt to 
ensure that the power which is needed for such governance is not 
abused by those who are called upon to do the governing.”13 
It involves the idea that government must be carried out according 
to pre-determined rules which at the same time restrain 
governmental activity. This idea of restraints developed from 
medieval notions of natural law superior to any human laws and the 
Christian doctrine of personality, which, by emphasising the worth 
of the individual, opposed any despotic exercise of political 
authority.^
Accordingly, it does not m atter very much whether the structure 
of the government is unitary or federal, though the federal 
organisation of society can be considered an important way of 
entrenching the restraint principle central to the idea of 
constitutionalism.
If then the essence of constitutionalism is the existence of 
limitations or restraints on governmental power, the question arises 
how to m ake these restraints effective. It is in relation to this, that 
the existence of a written constitution becomes very relevant and 
im portant to the concept of constitutionalism.
Ever since the lead given by France and the United States in the 
eighteenth century, the view has become firmly established that the 
restraints on the exercise of governmental power to be effective 
must be embodied in a supreme written document, preferably 
enforceable, by parties before a judiciary which is independent of 
the other organs of government. The written constitution ensures, 
as Chief Justice Marshall of the U.S. Supreme Court pointed out in
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Marburv v. Madison,15 that the limitations placed on government 
are known and, therefore, excursions outside these limits can be 
more easily checked. There is, however, no uniformity in practice 
about whether the ‘policing’ of the Constitution should be 
perform ed by the judiciary, or simply by hoping that the organs of 
government will restrain themselves and keep within the 
boundaries of their constitutional powers.16 Perhaps, the boldest 
one can get in this area is to assert that some countries rely on the 
judiciary as well as the legislature to keep the boundaries of 
governmental power undisturbed, while others leave everything 
entirely to the good sense of legislators.
One more thing ought to be said about the ‘Constitution’. No 
country, in my opinion, has a wholly ‘written’ or wholly ‘unwritten’ 
constitution. Any one wanting to study ‘the law of the constitution’ 
of any country should go beyond the existence of a written 
document. An appraisal of constitutionalism in a country, with one 
written document called the constitution, will be sadly deficient if it 
only focused on the constitutional document. There must also exist 
in the ethos of that particular society belief in the idea that the 
power of government ought to be restrained.
If we may summarise, the key concern of constitutionalism is the 
division of governmental power, in such a way that there is an 
effective restraint on the arbitrariness inherent in power so that the 
individual in society will be the beneficiary. Such a system of 
restraints may be embodied partly in a written document and partly 
left to be enforced by the force of tradition. But it is important that 
these restraints be legal, that the government so restrained be under 
law and that these restraints be enforceable before an independent 
body of arbiters in the event of a claim by an individual of their 
violation. Separation of Powers, Rule of Law, Judicial Review, to 
m ention only a few of the key ideas which constitute the 
Constitutional lawyer’s merchandise, are only a breakdown into 
smaller proportions of the basic idea of Constitutionalism.
Civil Liberties
In the preceding section, we said a governing process is 
‘constitutional’ if the rulers are subject to a body of rules and 
principles, which limit the exercise of their power. The most 
im portant set of legal restraints on governmental action concern 
those rules and principles which protect ‘civil liberties.’17
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The idea of ‘civil liberties’ contains two elements described by 
Professor d 'Entreves as ‘negative’ and ‘positive iiberty’ in his book 
The Notion o f  a State/* That is to say ‘civil liberty’ has both positive 
and negative attributes. Indeed whenever we talk of building an 
‘open’ and ‘self-governing’ society we are referring to these two 
attributes.of ‘civil liberty’.19 Again, these two sides of the idea are 
what we refer to in our discussions about a ‘liberal’ and a 
‘dem ocratic’ society; the English concept of the ‘rule of law’ also 
expresses essentially the same idea although its emphasis seems to 
be more on ‘negative liberty’.
Included in the contemporary understandings about civil liberties 
are certain rights described as “social and economic rights” on 
which emphasis is placed by developing and socialist countries. 
These rights, which are indeed an offshoot of positive liberty, 
embody the belief that the collective power of the state should be 
used to achieve egalitarian ends. By advocating state intervention 
for the equalising of society, the proponents of these rights hope to 
m ake it possible for the individual to enjoy his liberty in a 
meaningful way.
In both aspects of the expression, the focus of civil liberty is the 
individual, his relationship to the state and to his fellows. In the 
negative sense, it is concerned with carving for the individual an 
area immune to the power of the state. Individuals must be free to 
do the things not regulated, in the sense of prohibited, by law. It 
calls for a careful balancing of law and the dictates of order. This 
essentially negative outlook of liberty is often criticised on the 
ground that it pays insufficient attention to the problem of how 
power is to be exercised and by whom.
How power is to be exercised and by whom is what d'Entreves 
characterises as ‘positive liberty’. Positive liberty gives a popular 
basis to the civil liberty concept. It derives from the belief that 
everyone should be his own master, or at least, should have a say in 
all decisions that affect him. In modern times, it is expressed as 
popular sovereignty.
The negative and positive elements of the concept of civil liberty 
have not always been bed-fellows and even now tension is 
discernible between them .'’0 It was feared by well-meaning persons 
that ‘positive liberty’ was a threat to negative liberty. By justifying 
the participation of all in the governmental process, it was argued
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that the individual will be subjected to the ‘tyranny of numbers’. 
Secondly, positive liberty, it was thought, would result in a 
‘levelling of values’, a denial of the role of self-differentiation. 
Finally, the worst danger seen in positive liberty was that it could be 
used to destroy liberty altogether. We just need to reflect on the 
many ways in which plebiscites, referenda and other forms of direct 
appeals to the electorate have been used to establish regimes which 
have engaged in activities completely inimical to individual rights to 
understand this fear.
Negative liberty has also been used as a cloak for exploitation."1 
Negative liberty dressed as laissez-faire, in its advocacy of free 
enterprise, was used to defend existing inequalities in many 
societies. It is interesting to note in this context that in the 
celebrated Ghanaian case of Re A k o to 22 the Attorney-General 
(the late Geoffrey Bing) in urging that American practice should 
not be used as a guide in the determination of the constitutionality 
of the Preventive Detention Act of 1958, emphasised the fact that in 
1905 the U.S. Supreme Court had, in Lochner v. New York,23 by 
upholding freedom of contract, thwarted the efforts of the New 
York legislature to improve on the lot of the worker.
Civil liberties whether in the positive or negative sense are usually 
depicted as a piece of ‘bourgeois ideology’. This is hardly accurate. 
It is true that the concept has seen much elaboration in the writings 
of political theorists in the societies usually referred to in 
contem porary times as ‘bourgeois’ or ‘capitalist’. Indeed some of 
the notable parents and defenders of the concept will seem to 
confirm this view: Hobbes, Locke, Rousseau, Mill and
M ontesquieu. However, modern evidence with regard to the 
concept makes a large hole in that characterisation. The 1954
Constitution of the Peoples Republic of China and the 1977 
Constitution of the Soviet Union both have provisions embodying 
the civil liberties idea.24 Perhaps, as some commentators have 
suggested, these provisions are only for propaganda.25 These 
countries are the leading non-bourgeois states today. The fact that 
'hey have found it necessary, for whatever motive, to include these 
ideas in their constitutions should make us hesitate to claim that 
civil liberties are the product of a particular historical period, 
abstract theory or a particular type of economic and social 
>rganisation. Rightly has it been maintained that there is nothing in
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the concept of civil liberties which makes it intrinsically opposed to 
state action
“directed to removing obstacles to the full development of 
human personality, or to the effective participation of all citizens 
in political life, when such obstacles are due to their particular 
economic or social condition, or to the privileged position of 
certain groups within the state.’’26 
Civil liberty, then, includes, political, social and economic rights. 
Politically it involves freedom of conscience, thought, expression, 
press, association, assembly and religion. The social and economic 
rights include the right to property, to work, to a decent standard of 
living, to education and to equal treatm ent.2
How are these Liberties secured? It is true, as Learned Hand 
wrote, that:
“Liberty lies in the hearts of men and women; when it dies there 
no constitution, no law, no court can save it; no constitution, no 
law, no court can do much to help it.
However, it has been realized that depending only on the good 
sense of human beings is not enough. Consequently, in our 
contemporary society, vast energies have been spent and continue 
to be expended on finding the best formula for the protection of 
these liberties and for their maximisation.
Two basic methods are currently in use. The first technique, 
exemplified by British practice, leaves the protection of civil 
liberties to the operation of the ordinary laws of the country, e.g. 
criminal law, contract, torts etc. and the provision of effective 
judicial remedies.
The second method involves the formal identification of these 
liberties in a written constitution, care being taken to ensure that 
the dynamic nature of liberty is not thereby lost. However, the 
realisation of the potentially precarious nature of the first approach, 
whose effectiveness depends considerably on the human factor in 
government, has led, since the French and American revolutions, 
to widespread use of the second method.
The second method involves not only the embodiment of these 
liberties in the constitutional document. It also involves making 
these liberties “ justiciable” , that is to say enforceable in the courts 
at the instance of an aggrieved individual. A further development of 
the second approach is the attempt to internationalise the
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protection of these liberties. The U.N. Declaration of Human 
Rights of 1948 is one example. But by far one of the most important 
developments in this area is the European Convention on Human 
Rights adopted in 1950. This is because the Convention does not 
only outline standards which should be striven for by national 
governments but also provides an enforcement machinery which 
can be used by a dissatisfied national of most of the signatory states. 
This provides “ a remedy in reserve -  a long stop to catch the failures 
of the domestic system.”29
The embodiment of these rights in the constitution does not 
necessarily mean that all the rights should be made justiciable. This 
is because a close analysis of some of the rights embodied, especially 
in the idea of positive liberty, will disclose that they deal with 
m atters which cannot be properly resolved by the machinery of the 
judicial process. There is the need, therefore, to draw a distinction, 
in the constitutional document, between those rights which are 
m eant to be enforced through the courts and others, which, though 
no less important, are intended only to inform governmental 
activity, or to be enforced through processes other than judicial.20
The difficulties involved in not drawing such a distinction can be 
illustrated by one of the clauses in Article 13(1) of the 1960 
Constitution of Ghana. The clause provides:
“That every citizen of Ghana should receive his fair share of the 
produce yielded by the development of the country.”
Now, if one takes the view that this clause contains a justiciable right, 
certain problems immediately arise. Can an individual, for 
example, then arrest the budget of the government on the grounds 
that it denies him a “fair share of the produce yielded by the 
development of the country”? How is a court to solve the problems 
of the size of the national cake and the share which, in respect of a 
particular litigant is to be considered fair? Perhaps, it was for 
reasons such as this that the Supreme Court ruled in Re A koto that 
Article 13(1) was not justiciable. I must point out, though, that the 
ourt could have decided to enforce these rights selectively. 
Development
I propose to attempt no comprehensive definition of the term 
evelopm ent’. Suffice it to say that the word is used to denote 
iange politically, socially and economically. It is used to express 
the need for a transformation of society in a progressive, positive
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and desirable sense.
Development does not only involve the changing of society by the 
improvement of living conditions, the generation of wealth and the 
opening up of employment avenues, the provision of educational 
facilities and ensuring that a rational basis exists for the distribution 
of the ‘national cake’. In a developing country, such as Ghana, it 
means, above all, the attainment of these ends within the shortest 
possible time. The late Prof. Bentsi-Enchill put it thus:
“ ... the gathering momentum of technological development in the 
advanced countries is leaving us further and further behind, and 
... we have no choice, but to adopt urgent and radical, even 
revolutionary tactics for speeding up the acquisition of the 
required know-how if we are serious in our determination to 
achieve general emancipation as a self-respecting people”32 
The need to develop and become respected resulted in the main 
emphasis on development, in the Third World Countries, being 
placed on economic development. In this choice also we were 
victims of time. We had attained nation-hood at a time when 
economic development had become the major concern of modern 
society. Economic development was elevated to “ the status of a 
m ajor criterion of the world’s judgment of any particular 
country.”33 Economic progress became more precious in the eyes 
of the world than any other values. It became the gate-way to 
international respectability and acceptance. That, in part, explains 
Brazil’s present stature in the world community.
The focus on economic development is, moreover, not 
irrational. For economic development increases wealth, and wealth 
increases the range of human choice.34 Economic development 
augments the supply of essentials for life and enables us actually to 
enjoy life. It provides the wealth necessary for improvement in 
health facilities which, in turn, extends m an’s life span. It enables 
the state to provide more goods and services; it enables society to 
minimize inequalities. In other words, by embarking on economic 
developm ent, we will be able to eradicate, or at least minimise the 
effects of poverty, ignorance and disease, which are among the most 
debilitating afflictions in our countries.
The development needs have been perceived by some as 
requiring a change of the ideological base of society; in particular, 
we have been advised that having been liberated and redeemed
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without our being in sight of the end to our woes, our salvation lies 
only in socialism.
The appeal of socialism for some is understandable. First, there is 
the success story of rapid development of Russia under socialist 
ideology. Secondly, Marxist-Leninists (or Maoists) by their 
persistent opposition to colonialism have endeared themselves to 
many of the people in the Third World. Besides, developing 
countries which see their development in terms of wrestling their 
economies from over dependence on selfish Western economic 
interests, find socialism’s denunciation of the exploitative nature of 
the ‘capitalist economies’ of the West very comforting. It is hardly 
surprising to see that, in the Third World, a good number of people 
who are alive to the problems in their countries and who speak out 
against them consider themselves, or are considered by those in 
authority as communists.
Ghana, 1957-1975
We will now make an appraisal of our Constitutional past in the 
light of the foregoing analysis.
It is now a notorious fact that Ghana became independent in 1957. 
Between 1957 and now, we have experienced two bouts each of 
civilian and military rule. In the process we have acquired three 
“constitutions” and two quasi-constitution military
Proclam ations,3  ^ a record which should recall to our mind the 
famous story reported by Gyandoh and Griffiths in the Introduction 
to their book “A Sourcebook of the Constitutional Law of Ghana” 
about the French Constitution. According to the learned authors, 
an eager student’s attempt to purchase the latest French 
Constitution from a London book-seller was met with the curt 
announcem ent: “Sir, in this Bookshop we do not sell
periodicals.”36
The first of the three civilian Constitutions was the Independence 
Constitution of 1957. This structured the government after British 
ideas of responsible parliamentary government. It provided for a 
Legislature, a Cabinet and a Judiciary with a power of review; the 
judiciary was also sufficiently insulated against executive 
interference to assure it some measure of independence and 
security. By far the most important check on governmental power 
was the provision requiring the establishment of Regional
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Assemblies to which certain measures affecting the Constitution 
were to be referred and whose consent was necessary for the validity 
of such measures. These provisions were inserted in the 
Constitution to assuage the fears of regions which felt uneasy about 
the possibility of their interests being disregarded by the majority 
and who had been agitating therefore for a federal structure of 
government immediately before independence. However, the 
passage in 1958 of the Constitution (Repeal of Restrictions) Act 
swept these checks away.
Indeed the story of the death of the Regional Assemblies so 
typifies the lack of understanding in our society about what a 
constitutional government involves that perhaps it needs to be re­
told here. The parties in opposition to the C.P.P. boycotted the 
elections to the Regional Assemblies. The C.P.P. thus won control 
of all the Regional Assemblies. The cynic may consider it one of the 
abiding epitaphs to the C .P .P .’s respect for constitutional forms 
that the C.P.P.-dom inated assemblies met only once and transacted 
one solid business: namely, they resolved to DISSOLVE 
themselves. Thus, whatever check the Regional Assembly 
mechanism was to exercise over governmental activity was lost. 
Needless to point out that a round was thereby lost in the quest for 
constitutionalism in Ghana.37
Three years after independence, Ghana became a republic and 
adopted a new Constitution, the 1960 Republican Constitution. This 
Constitution, which was meant to put our sovereignty beyond the 
pale of doubt, established a government which was a blend of the 
Presidential and parliamentary systems.
It provided for a President, Parliament and a Judiciary in which 
the executive, legislative and judicial powers were respectively 
vested. It also had the unique feature of vesting the Presidency with 
limited legislative power. 8 A n amendment ro the Constitution in 
1964 gave the President discretion to dismiss Judges of the Supreme 
and High Courts for reasons which appeared to him sufficient.39 
A nother amendment adopted at the same time made Ghana a one- 
party state. W hatever else could be said of the Constitution either in 
its original or amended form, no informed scholar ought to say that 
it established “constitutional government” . We have, of course, 
often heard that whatever charges could be levelled against the 
C .P .P . era, its leaders could not be accused of non-constitutional
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behaviour. We must now consider such assertions as uninformative 
as well as ridiculous.
In fairness to the C.P.P. government, it must be noted that that 
government, although it used the law as a tool for oppression, 
always ensured that all its acts were backed by legislation, and were 
consistent with the Constitution. But as we have already observed, 
government according to a constitution is not necessarily equal to 
constitutional government.
Various organs of government under the 1960 Constitution as 
am ended failed to perform their tasks in a way as to constitute them 
into the checks on governmental power they were designed to be 
John Kraus’s general picture of Parliament in the last four years of 
the Nkrumah regime can hardly be bettered:
“ It was manipulated, often adulatory, uncritical, uninformed and 
unprepared, in part due to the governmental propensity to attach 
certificates of urgency to bills...”40 
The 1960 Constitution thus established a government which bore no 
relationship to notions of good government in our traditional 
system of government and did not accord with prevailing 
understandings about constitutionalism.
In 1966, the Armed Forces in conjunction with the Police 
unlawfully put an end to the oppressive rule of the C.P.P. They 
accused the government of betraying the trust of the people.41 
U nder a Proclamation passed a few days after the coup d ’etat in 
1966, the military and police leaders established themselves in 
governm ent.42 The National Liberation Council so established was 
vested with the legislative and executive powers of the State. The 
judiciary were left substantially with their pre-coup powers.
In line with its caretaker image, the N.L.C. took steps to return 
the country to ‘constitutional rule'. A Constitutional Commission 
was appointed to make proposals for a new Constitution because 
the 1960 Constitution was rightly looked upon as having facilitated 
dictatorial rule. The Commission’s proposals were later modified 
and promulgated by a Constituent Assembly. This was the 1969 
Constitution. Late in 1969, elections were held under this 
Constitution. The Progress Party, led by the late Dr. K. A. Busia 
emerged dominant, winning 105 of the 140 Parliamentary seats at 
stake. Designed to prevent the rise of a dictatorial regime, the 1969 
Constitution was the most ambitious attempt to date to be informed
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by the basic concerns of Constitutionalism.
Laudable though these efforts were and in spite of its generally 
acknowledged commitment to constitutional government, Dr. 
Busia’s government was overthrown before it was three years old. 
Its austere economic measures dictated by the fall in the world 
m arket price for cocoa and the worsening external debt situation 
are said to be the principal factors which brought it down. There is 
evidence also that cuts in the Defence budget caused that 
governm ent’s downfall.4'^  However, we must not lose sight of the 
fact that the Busia government, whatever else is claimed for it was 
politically naive, arrogant, and generally not as dedicated to 
constitutionalism in practice as its rhetoric suggested.44
Since 1972 Ghana has been administered by a military regime. In 
October 1975, the military authorities tried to introduce some order 
into the administration. They formulated rules which, though 
unsatisfactory in many important respects, appear to be an attempt 
to ensure that government’ will be conducted according to 
predeterm ined rules. But those rules unwisely gave to the office of 
the Chairman of the Supreme Military Council created in 1975 just 
as many powers as the President under the 1960 Constitution. It is a 
sad commentary on the competence of those who served in the 
S.M .C. until the overthrow of its Chairman on July 5,1978 that they 
dared accuse the former Chairman of running a “one-man show". 
For the perceptive reader quickly discovers, upon reading the 
Decree which established the S.M.C. in 1975, that the structure of 
the government was designed to lead to just this type of one-man 
show .4~
CIVIL LIBERTIES
It we turn to the course of civil liberties during the period under 
examination, we will observe that the two techniques, we have 
earlier pin-pointed, were employed for their protection. From 1957 
to 1969 and since 1972 the protection of civil liberty has followed 
generally the British idea of entrusting the task to the operation of 
the ordinary laws of the land.
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The 1957 Constitution did contain a few provisions on civil 
liberties. These provisions guaranteed freedom of conscience or the 
right to freely profess, practise or propagate any religion; property 
was not to be taken compulsorily without compensation and racial 
discrimination was outlawed. The 1960 Constitution in its Article 
13(1) required the President to declare his commitment to the 
protection of certain rights. Any speculation that these declarations 
constituted a bill of enforceable rights was quickly dispelled by the 
Supreme Court in Re A koto . The period up to 1969 saw, in many 
respects, some of the worst abuses of civil liberties. Through 
detentions without trial, harassment by members of the notorious 
Special Branch, interference in the judicial process, the C.P.P. 
government reduced Ghanaians to a band of frightened people who 
trem bled at the coming of the radio news at one o ’clock in the 
afternoon every day (nowadays it seems to be 2.00 p.m .) and who 
lived in constant fear of that dreadful dawn knock on the door. This 
period dem onstrates sharply the danger in leaving the protection of 
our liberty to the politicians and the lawyers.
Having experienced a period of rule during which the law itself 
was used to destroy our rights, we made our most impressive effort 
to date, to ensure not only that government was conducted 
according to law’ but also that a strict limit was set to the type of laws 
the government could make, in the 1969 Constitution. Seventeen
Articles were devoted to a detailed statement of the content of civil 
liberties guaranteed. The circumstances under which very carefully 
circumscribed derogations could be made from them were clearly 
delineated. Further, in the Amendment Clause, it was provided 
that these rights could not be detracted or derogated from. The 
amending process itself was heavily circumscribed to deter frivolous 
amendments.
The rights so identified were made justiciable. Articles 1(2) and 2, 
more or less, made every citizen a watch-dog over the Constitution 
The judiciary were empowered to ensure that governmental 
behaviour, whether legislative or otherwise, was within 
constitutional prescriptions. Finally, the security and independence 
>f the judges were secured against governmental excesses.
The Busia government, by and large, respected these rights. Its 
lark corners, as far as civil liberties were concerned, were the 
passage under a certificate of urgency of the Criminal Code 
(Am endm ent) Act by which it sought to stem the revival of any
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interest in Nkrumah and the C.P.P. Many people were also 
disturbed by the then Prime Minister’s politically unwise reaction to 
the Supreme C ourt’s decision in the Sallah case because it was 
thought to be a subtle attempt to put pressure on the judiciary. 
M ention must also be made of the Industrial Relations Act by which 
the government sought to weaken and/or infiltrate the Trade Union 
M ovement; the dismissal of the Editor of the state-owned 
newspaper, the Daily Graphic, apparently for opposing the Prime 
M inister’s views on dialogue with South Africa; and the harassment 
of journalists opposed to the government with criminal 
prosecutions. If people tended to magnify these aberrations, and I 
am not suggesting for a moment that they were of no consequence, 
it seems to be largely because the government failed to realise the 
wisdom in the biblical belief enshrined in the motto of one of our 
Halls of Residence that “ to whom much is given much is 
expected.”46 Given the rhetoric of key members both before going 
into government and after, the Progress Party government should 
have realised that for many Ghanaians even an angry reaction to an 
admittedly provocative situation would be considered a mortal sin 
by their fellow countrymen.
The least said about the period under military rule, perhaps, the 
better. First, the very existence of military rule with its ideas of 
government with unlimited power to use law for the attainment -of 
any ends is itself more than a threat to civil liberties. Secondly, the 
effort to subject the majority of us non-military men to military 
discipline through, for example, the Subversion Decree is to say the 
least unconscionable. Thirdly, the widespread practice of 
“protective and preventive custody” , by which an individual can be 
kept for many days in detention without trial, the general lack of 
respect for legal strictures which seems to be the peculiar affliction 
of soldiers in power, the muzzling of free speech, all pose the 
gravest threat to liberty. In fairness to both the N.L.C. and 
N .R .C ./S .M .C . regimes, though, it must be said that the degree of 
derogations from constitutionalism and civil liberties fall far below 
what we hear of military regimes elsewhere and is not too violent 




Development for Ghana, irrespective of the strategy employed, 
has m eant rapid transformation of our society, the eradication of 
poverty, disease and ignorance, the elimination of the over­
dependence on the cocoa crop, industrialisation and the laying of 
the necessary infrastructure for the economic take-off. Certain 
impressive strides have been made in this regard. The building of 
the Akosom bo Dam has made available cheap hydro-electric 
power, although it seems in the main to benefit only the capitalist 
organisation, VALCO. Increases in the educational facilities 
coupled with liberal educational policies have made education 
possible for many of us. We now have more health facilities than 
before independence. A reasonably wide network of roads and 
other communication facilities have been built. And though the 
fruits of development such as exist have been unevenly distributed, 
some efforts have been made to improve the lot of the country’s 
rural population.
Lest I am misunderstood, the point I am trying to make is that 
anyone who left this country in 1956 and returned this year will be 
impressed by what has been done development-wise. If Ghana is 
considered a failure in this regard, this is because many feel that 
given its available resources, with a little bit of realism in 
developm ent planning, optimum use of its facilities, the eradication 
of corruption and the willingness of the planners to learn and 
understand what makes our economy tick, more could have been 
done.
G hana’s experiences here call for one comment. The attem pt to 
put the blame of the slow pace of development on the constitutional 
governmental schemes with which the developing countries entered 
the post independence era must be considered as ex post facto 
rationalisation. For, in Ghana, the evidence is quite strong that the 
lowest periods for constitutionalism and civil liberty coincided also 
with the least development. This is clear if one compares the 
ievelopm ent between 1950 to 1960 with that between 1961 to 1978. 
Conclusions
W hat are the prospects for the future? If we are to adequately
ovide against the evil moments of our past life we have to learn 
the right lessons. First, it must be quite clear from the foregoing 
analysis that we have hardly experienced constitutional rule in this
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country. There is the uninformed tendency to assume that our 
civilian regimes were constitutional. They were not. The Busia 
period was. for this purpose, too short for any meaningful 
conclusions to be drawn. If the signs it gave are anything to go by, 
there was a strong likelihood that it would have degenerated into 
government only according to the constitution.
Secondly, we have a crisis of role definition. One often hears the 
assertion that trying to run the affairs of the state is not the proper 
role for our military. Implicit in this assertion is the assumption that 
governing is not the job for soldiers in Ghana. Perhaps, this is so. 
The evidence in our traditional constitutional system does not seem 
to square with this. We see traditional office-holders in our 
institution of Chieftaincy who are military officers in that system. It 
is often difficult to determine whether they hold their political 
offices by virtue of their importance militarily to the state or vice 
versa. The Ghanaian soldier is not brought up in Britain, France or 
the U nited States. We cannot, therefore, assume that the roleofthe 
Ghanaian soldier is or must be the same as that of the British. 
French or American soldier. Even if we want to ensure that the 
soldier does not seize power, we have to work out this consciously. 
The conclusion that power has been usurped by the military only 
because they have the guns is easy but not enough.
Thirdly, we have to realise that the governmental machinery we 
have operated at the center has in a way been responsible for some 
of our woes. It cuts out a large number, shall we say the majority, of 
our citizenry from participating in the governing process. If one 
ponders seriously over our political life since independence, in 
particular if one directs one’s mind to the traditional governmental 
process, one will be struck or ought to be struck by one realisation -  
namely, that while constitutional government has been in crisis at 
the center, the traditional governmental system has remained 
entirely constitutional throughout this period. The difficulties it has 
experienced have been largely due to the interference of the 
politicians at the center. This has been so because in part the people 
have been vigiiant. We need to fashion principles of governance 
which make the large majority of our people relate to the power at 
the center in the way they relate to their chiefs.
Fourthly, it must be clear that institutionalisation of 
constitutional government, the enjoyment of liberty, our need to 
develop -  all these aspirations cannot be entrusted to lawyers,
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economists and the like. Lawyers as judges, legal advisers to 
government, politicians etc. have had a hand in the battles lost to 
constitutionalism and liberty in this country. The Re A koto  decision 
was the work of lawyers; the Protective Custody Decree and the 
Subversion Decree were the work of lawyers. As the government 
statem ent on the dismissal of Azu Crabbe as Chief Justice made 
clear, interferences with the judiciary such as the abolition of the 
Supreme Court appear to have been at the instigation of the lawyers 
association.4 W hatever may be the pretensions to power of our 
current military leaders, a good number of people will not be 
subjected to unjustified detentions without trial if the judges will 
show some imagination in their handling of Habeas Corpus 
applications that come before then. It is not enough after the 
lawyers have helped to create the mess and instal a dictator to turn 
round and appear to be in the fore-front of the battle against 
tyranny.
O ur economists must stop their drift towards what the late 
Schumacher described as “ the abandonment of wisdom ’. They 
must realise that “small can be beautiful” . I get the impression as I 
listen to our economists that although they may have, by I.M.F. 
standards, impeccable qualifications, they have no business 
managing the Ghanaian economy. They simply do not appear to 
understand what makes the Ghanaian economy bleed. If that 
continues we will stagger from the debilitating effects of one 
devaluation to another. Ghana deserves better than that.
O ur rulers must realise that upon a close examination, the very 
negation of the concepts of constitutionalism and liberties plays a 
large role in the failure of performance to match development 
objectives. For planning to be effective, there is need for popular 
involvement in the planning process itself. Objectives must be fixed 
in the full knowledge of existing facilities. This calls for exchange of 
ideas. The plan that emerges must result from what the late Mr. 
Justice Holmes of the U.S. Supreme Court described as “the 
competition of the market of ideas.”48 We cannot afford to ignore 
or suppress the ideas of some of the skilled personnel available as 
■ve have tried to do. While such views mav onlv have nuisance 
value, there is a good chance that such views will force the planners to
ower their sights and to plan realistically.
For us as a nation, there is an additional reason why we whould 
cherish liberty of the individual. We are a nation of different
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peoples. That is a fact. It may be true that decision-making in the 
traditional African political systems was based on consensus. But it 
must be remembered that the consensus was possible because of the 
ethnic homogeneity. When two or more ethnic groups are brought 
together into one nation, the prospects for consensus politics might 
be more difficult. That will suggest that we should place a high 
premium on constitutionalism and liberty for our survival as a 
nation than we have done in the past.
Now, the view has been expressed in recent times that the whole 
search for a new government is a wasted effort. In particular, it has 
been pointed out that a lot of people who appeared before the Ad 
Hoc Committee on Union Government were concerned with bread 
and butter matters. As a student of constitutional history, however, I 
cannot subscribe to the view that the search for a new form of 
government is a wasted effort. For history is replete with situations 
where, confronted with the problems we have encountered in the 
past, other people had taken a hard look at their institutions and 
changed them even radically. The Americans did it in the 18th 
century and early in this century, the Russians also. So the search in 
my opinion must continue. What should not happen is that we 
should not succumb to the tendency to be intolerant of positions we 
find unacceptable. Society’s known approach for changing the 




* Most of the research for this lecture was done in Leiden for a 
paper in partial fulfilment of my obligations under a fellowship 
as a NUFFIC Fellow at the Law Faculty of the State University 
of Leiden, The Netherlands, in 1976.1 am extremely grateful to 
the members of the Public Law Department of the Leiden Law 
Faculty especially Professor Koopmans and Mr. Jit Peters, for 
their invaluable criticisms of the original paper. I am also 
grateful to Prof. Gyandoh of the Legon Law Faculty for his 
comments on an earlier draft of this lecture.
References
1. See generally Edward Shils, The Fortunes of Constitutional Government in the 
Political Development o f the New States, in John H. Hallowell (ed.), 
Development: For What? (Duke University Press, 1964) pp. 103-143; Maxwell 
Owusu, The Search for Solvency: Background to the fall o f Ghana’s Second 
Republic, 1969-1972, AFRICA TODAY Vol. 19. No. 1 (1972) pp. 52-60 at 54; 
Opeyemi Ola, The Cultural Basis of the Crisis o f Parliamentary Democracy in 
Africa, CIVILISATIONS Vol. 22 Nos. 3 & 4 (1972).
2. Edward Shils, opcit., 123. ( I am extremely grateful to Professor Shils who drew 
my attention to this article when I was a participant in a seminar he conducted at 
Leiden University).
3. Quoted in Nwabueze, Constitutionalism in the Emergent States, (London, 1973) 
p. 168.
4. For the various meanings given to “socialism” in the developing countries in 
Africa, see William H. Friedland and Carl G. Rosberg Jr. (eds.), African 
Socialism (Standford University Press, 1964).
5. Roger Garaudy, Peut-on etre Communiste aujourd'hui? (Paris, 1968); 
especially-his Chapter 2, Songes et Mensonges de la liberte, offers a persuasive 
argument of the ‘capitalist veneer' of the supposedly libertarian movements such 
as the French Revolution of 1789.
6. A good example is Apter and Doombos, Development and the Political Process: 
A Plan for a Constitution, in David E. Apter, Political Change, (London, 1973) 
pp. 118-146; it is also to be found in AFRICA REVIEW, vol. 1 No. 1 (1971).
7. On 30th April 1978, a 23-man Constitutional Commission under the 
chairmanship of Dr. T. A. Mensah was appointed to draft proposals for a new 
Constitution to be considered by a Constituent Assembly to be increased to 55 
and it now has this task of drafting a Constitution for the Transitional National 
Government proposed by the Supreme Military Council as part of its phased 
programme of return to civilian rule. See S.M.C.D. 164 as amended by 
S.M.C.D. 173.
8. Shils, op.cit., note 1 supra, esp. pp. 142-143; cf. Ake, Explaining Political 
Instability in New States, JOURNAL OF MODERN AFRICAN STUDIES, 
vol. 11 No. 3 (1973) pp. 347-359, esp. p. 353.
23
9. For a detailed consideration of this concept, see Carl Friedrich, Constitutional 
Government and Democracy, revised ed. (Massachusets, 1950); Nwabueze 
op.cit., note 3 supra; de Smith. The New Commonwealth and its Constitutions, 
(1964). The reader is asked to note that “constitutionalism” and “constitutional 
government” are used interchangeably throughout this essay.
10. Nwabueze op,cit., pp. 1-2; Friedrich, op.cit., pp.31-32.
U . See works cited i.n note 9 supra; see also Wheare, Modern Constitution 
pp. 138-140.
12. Nwabueze, op.cit., p.5.
13. Friedrich, op.cit., p.35.
14. ibid. pp. 26-27.
15. 1 Cranch 137 (1803).
16. Ybema, Constitutionalism and Civil Liberties (Lieden, 1973), suggests in his 
Introduction that the best approach perhaps might be one that makes for an 
interplay between the judiciary and the legislature.
17. In modern times “civil liberties" are more likely to be referred to as 
“fundamental human rights” to emphasise their importance to the body politic.
18. A. P. d’Entreves. The Notion of a State, (Oxford. 1967) pp. 201-221.
19. Lusky, The Unwritten American Constitution, 2 Columbia Law Alumni 
Observer Part 1, Nov. 1. 1972; Part II, December 15, 1972.
20. d’Entreves, op.cit., note 18 supra, pp. 215-217.
21. Garaudv, op.cit., note 5 supra, is one of the most relling exposes in this area,
22. Gyandoh.Jr. and Griffiths, A Sourcebook of the Constitutional Law of Ghana, 
Vol. 2 Part 1, 160-187. The learned Attorney-General’s submissions are to be 
found on pp. 160-168. The particular point is at p. 166.
23. 198 U.S. 45(1905).
24. Ian Brownlie. Basic Documents on Human Rights, (Oxford, 1971) Part 1, 
Chapters 6 & 8. The Sov^t Union adopted a new Constitution in October,
1977.
25. E. L. Johnson, An Introduction to the Soviet Union Legal System (London, 
1972)pp. 96-105; Nwa^ueze, op.cit., pp.2-3.
26. d'Entreves, op.cit., p. 209; Sir Humphrey Waldock, The Legal Protection of 
Human Rights; National and International, in Vallat (ed.), An Introduction to 
the Study of Human Rights (Europa. London, 1970) at pp. 87-88 makes the 
same point. Professor Klein makes a similar point in his article on the constitu­
tional protection of the equality principle in the Federal Republic of Germany, 
see T. Koopmans (ed.), Constitutional Protection of Equality (Leiden, 1975) 
pp. 102-103.
27. Koopmans, op.cit., note 26 supra, gives an extremely useful insight into the 
comparative treatment of the equality principle in the'constitutional systemsof 
Russia, U.S., Canada, West Germany and France.
28. Quoted in Ybema, op.cit., note 26 supra, p. 251.
29. Sir Waldock in Vallat, op.cit., note 26 supra, p. 91.
30. The Indian Constitution of 1949 is instructivein this respect. It contains one set 
of rights described as “Directive Principles” designed to inform the 
formulation of state policy and also a set of justiciable rights, see Brownlie, 
op.cit., note 24 supra, pp. 29-45.
31. For a detailed treatment of this subject, see Foster and Zolberg (eds.), Ghana
and the Ivory Coast: Perspectives on modernization (Chicago, 1971); Lofchie
24
(ed.), The State of the Nations: Constraints on Development in Independent 
Africa (1971); Hallowell (ed/), Development: For What? (Duke University 
Press 1964),
32. K. Bentsi-Enchill, Institutional Challenges of our Time, (J. B. Danquah 
Memorial Lectures; Fourth Series (February, 1971, Accra) 1 bird Lecture, p. 
21.
33. Shils, op.cit., note 1 supra, p. 117.
34. Schatz, Implications of Economic Development, in Flallowell, op.cit.. note 31 
supra, p.57.
35. For the texts of these documents, see Gyandoh Jr. and Griffiths, Volume 1 
(Part 1).
36. ibid. volume II (Part 2) p. IX.
37. See generally Bennion, Constitutional Rule of Ghana.
38. Article 55. The power was only to be exercised by the first President and did not 
inure to the benefit of his successors.
39. Gyandoh and Griffiths, op.cit., note 35 supra, p. 171.
40. In Foster and Zolberg, op. cit., note 31 supra, p. 49.
41. J. A. Ankrah, The Future of the Military in Ghana. AFRICAN FORUM, vol. 2 
No. 1 (1966) pp;5-16. It must be added that the military were also dissatisfied 
with the whittling away of most of their amenities.
42. Proclamation for the Constitution of a National Liberation Council for the 
Administration of Ghana, and for other Matters connected therewith, see 
Gyandoh and Griffiths, op.cit., note 35 supra. For the claim that the 
administration so established was an “interim” one, see Hayfron-Benjamin J. 
(as he then was) in SHALABI v. ATTORNEY-GENERAL (1972) 1 G.L.R. 
259.
43. Maxwell Owusu, op.cit., note 1 supra. See also the dialogue which that article 
engendered between Dr. Owusu and Professor Segal in AFRICA TODAY 
(1972) vol. 19 No. 2, pp. 74-80.
44. Three examples will be enough for our present purpose: (1) The propensity of 
the Government to attach certificates of urgency to Bills. (2) The handling of 
the Odumase Farms issue. (3) The failure of Parliamentarians to declare their 
assets in accordance with the Constitution and the dragging, before the Bar of 
Parliament, of students for merely demanding that the Constitution be 
respected and complied with.
45. National Redemption Council (Establishment) Proclamation (Amendment) 
Decree, 1975 (N.R.C.D. 36). See my comment on this legislation under the 
title “N.R.C.D. 360: An Exercise in Revolutionary Constitutionalism?” in 
(1975) 12 U.G.L.J. 124.
46. Legon Hall.
47. Ghana Press Release No. 194/77.
48. Holmes dissent in ABRAMS v. U.S. 250 U.S. 616 (1919).
25
(S )® ©®
This work is licensed under a 
Creative Commons
Attribution -  Noncommercial - NoDerivs 4.0 License.
To view a copy of the license please see: 
http://creativecommons.Org/licenses/bv-nc-nd/4.0/
This is a download from the BLDS Digital Library on OpenDocs
http://opendocs.ids.ac.uk/opendocs/
i f ^ i Institute of 
Development Studies
